Currency as an Object of Security Interests

As the law stands, security rights in money are likely to be subject to different legal treatment, depending on whether money is regarded as a tangible asset or as an intangible asset, and depending on whether sums of money as a guarantee are assimilated with the secured creditor's property or not. Taking this observation as its starting point, the present essay suggests adopting a unified approach of legal nature of money, that is likely to justify that money should be subject to a simplified security regime. Without ignoring that it is bound to be dual, depending on whether sums of money as a guarantee are separated from the secured creditor's property or not, this security regime would be called upon to replace the present fungible assets, bank account and receivables pledge agreements, and also security trust on receivables and money, with a single money pledge agreement.

The rules of the lodging of this money pledge agreement will be designed to eliminate the never-ending debates as to whether the "cash collateral" vests ownership of the encumbered money in the secured creditor, or not. Indeed, the assimilation of the encumbered sums of money with the secured creditor's property will involve a sui generis division of the ownership rights that will be like an irregular usufruct by way of collateral, and that will grant the creditor neither mere preferential rights, nor ownership rights, nor any right similar to the right of a security trustee, but the right to dispose of money provisionally. This right of disposal will encumber temporarily the ownership rights that will remain in the hands of the grantor of the security

The rules of its lodging being therefore clarified, the rights granted by the money pledge agreement will be enforced more quickly and more effectively since the divided ownership of money will be reconstructed in the hands of the grantor of the security or in the hands of the secured creditor, depending on whether the secured debt will be paid or not, and without there being a need to wonder if the rights granted by the pledge have to be enforced either through judicial or contractual award of the right of ownership, or through legal, judicial or contractual compensation.